1. Introduction As the specific strategic planning approach described by Wack [1, 2] , scenario planning has been widely used as a means to develop organizational strategy for several decades, with many practitioners documenting its role in a variety of settings [3] [4] [5] [6] . While the primary purpose of scenario planning is to develop strategy, advocates also stress its value as an educational and potentially transformational exercise-including its ability to persuade participants to dislodge preexisting views [1, 6] , improve understanding of the organizational context [7] , provide a common instrument of communication among disparate actors [8] [9] [10] , and encourage relationships among participants [11, 12] . In particular, the scenario planning process may be a means of building networks and initiating collaboration [11] [12] [13] .
While the integrating function of scenario planning is not a new idea, the possibility of using scenario planning as a means for integration takes on a heightened significance in a context where public policy and planning seems increasingly in need of-and resistant to-inter-agency coordination. The need for coordination is especially apparent in the area of transportation policy and metropolitan urban development, where governments must address the complex issues of sustainability and equity, and where policy experts have frequently called for integrated policies that coordinate action across sectors and across space [14, 15] . Unfortunately, in the not uncommon situation where government consists of numerous fragmented agencies-as is the case in Portugal-the task of integration encounters significant obstacles [16, 17] . Integration between land use and transportation sectors may be the most challenging, but similar coordination is needed between long-term and short-term planning, between neighboring jurisdictions, between policy-makers and technical analysts, between transport modes, and between planning and other disciplines.
The ability of these disparate actors to produce coordinated policies-or, at a more demanding level, integrated policies-depends on their ability to work together at an organizational and individual level. Many authors imply that governments can simply mandate coordination and integration [18] , but in practice top-down requirements do not necessarily produce coordinated policies, especially in the absence of other supporting conditions. Faced with legal mandates to coordinate their actions, agencies sometimes comply, but other times they simply go through the motions without engaging in real collaboration. Such behavior has been observed both in Portuguese planning [19, 20] and in other policy contexts [21] . While much of the literature on policy integration in transportation and land use has focused on justifying the need for integration and identifying practical barriers [16] [17] [18] , relatively little has focused on ways of dissolving those barriers or finding ways in which collaboration actually occurs.
In this paper we consider the potential of a particular type of scenario planning to provide a path toward integration, via its ability (or inability) to build inter-organizational relationships and foster organizational learning. Does participation in a scenario planning process increase the likelihood of collaboration? That is, does it increase the likelihood of collaborating to improve prospects for improving urban management? We develop and demonstrate a survey-based methodology designed to investigate this question. Building from a theoretical model of inter-agency collaboration, the survey attempts to quantitatively measure changes in factors which contribute to the propensity to collaborate. We apply the survey to test the impacts of a scenario planning process conducted with Portuguese stakeholders. This paper begins with a review of scenario planning as a transformative activity, followed by discussion of how it may, in theory, lead to collaboration. Next, we present the survey methodology and results. We then discuss implications for scenario planning, concluding with recommendations for future research. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   3 we are referring to the -Shell approach.‖ Originally used to develop military strategy, scenario planning later became popular in business management and has since been employed in a wide range of contexts. The techniques employed by the Royal Dutch/Shell company in the 1970s, documented by Wack [1, 2] , set a standard for scenario planning in the private sector and have since been adapted to non-profit and public sector contexts [5, 6, 22, 23] . This specific form of scenario planning develops scenarios, or systematic stories about how the future may evolve, as a tool for strategic planning. The purpose is not necessarily to accurately predict the future, or to paint an ideal future, rather to call decision-makers' attention to the range of plausible futures under which to assess strategies [6, 24] .
The Shell process of scenario building follows some standard steps. After defining the focal issue and scope, participants identify key local factors and driving forces. Key local factors refer to aspects of the local context that impact the issue in question. These factors should be important and uncertain; that is, they should have an expected significant impact on the focal issue and their direction of evolution should be uncertain [25] . Driving forces are macro-level forces which influence the local factors, and should also be important and uncertain. For instance, for the issue of urban revitalization in Portugal a key local factor might be consumer demand for smaller apartments, and the underlying driving force may be demographic shifts toward smaller families. Participants then rank the driving forces by importance and uncertainty. Selecting combinations of the top-ranked forces, they construct scenarios that appear compelling, yet plausible and internally consistent. Participants then elaborate storylines detailing how these scenarios might evolve in the given context.
Objectives of scenario planning
Scenario planning aims primarily to develop strategy, but advocates also stress its value as a sensemaking and capacity-building exercise. According to Wack [1, 2] the process of working through the causal relationships of highly complex situations can -change the decision makers' assumptions about how the world works and compel them to reorganize their mental model of reality‖ [1] . The collective discussion of driving forces supposedly challenges participants' existing views of their organization and its context [1, 6] . Constructing scenarios helps people overcome intrinsic cognitive biases towards narrow and short-sighted perspectives, -stretching‖ participants' mental horizon, and creating a broader and more accurate understanding of their organization's reality [7] .
Several authors suggest that, by bringing together disparate actors in a common conversation, scenario planning works as an integrating activity [8, 9, 12] . The in-depth discussions presumably build stronger relationships among participants than typical in other forms of networking [11] . By encouraging an unconstrained mindset, hypothetically, the process induces participants to take more open views of each other and, in collectively constructing new mental frames of reference, participants orient their thinking in the same direction. Gray [12] suggests that scenario planning aims to build a -collective appreciation of the interdependencies among the stakeholders‖ (p. 181), noting the potential value of collaboration among participants. Roubelat [11] suggests that, by reframing their view of the larger context, actors may reconsider their organizational borders and relationships with other organizations. In this paper, we refer to these potential processual outcomes on organizations as second-order effects of scenario planning.
Other approaches to scenario planning and futures thinking
We focus on the Shell method of scenario planning because it is generally regarded as the -default‖ and most commonly used method [26] , but it is by no means the only possible approach to thinking about the future. While the Shell approach has been applied to a wide range of organizations and situations [27] , it may not be the most appropriate in all contexts. Indeed, poor match between scenario method and the context/purpose may be responsible for the -failure‖ of many scenario processes [28, 29] .
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Existing research has not adequately examined the effectiveness of particular scenario methods for particular situations. Bishop et al. [26] offer some guidance, reviewing scenario practices and identifying eight types of methods, each of which may have several variations. According to their typology, the Shell model is characterized by its concern with dimensions of uncertainty and is distinguished from other techniques by its methodological focus on driving forces. Bishop et al. assess the Shell method as having the advantage of the -right mix of technical sophistication and ease of use for a professional audience,‖ but limited by the difficulty of capturing the full range of future possibilities in a limited number of driving forces [26] . They judge it to be moderately difficult to use (about average difficulty compared to other methods) and appropriate for group use. By this assessment, the Shell method seems an appropriate technique for the context at hand (i.e. a group of professionals in transportation and urban planning), but not necessarily the best or only technique.
Other approaches to scenario planning and futures thinking in general may also encourage collaboration among participants. Scenario planning, as typified by the Shell method, constructs plausible scenarios, providing a way to develop strategy that accounts for uncertainty. Alternative scenarios methods might ask participants to envision an ideal or preferred future and discuss how to achieve it (akin to -backcasting‖), while other approaches present participants with predetermined scenarios based on archetypes, such as -continued growth‖ or -collapse‖ [30] . Some hybrid approaches address both uncertainty and ideal goals by combining the use of plausible and preferred futures [31] . All of these variations on scenario planning, whether they focus on ideal visions or uncertainty, are designed to inform strategy or action around a given issue. This -problem-oriented‖ approach, as Slaughter [32] would classify it, makes them particularly relevant for policy makers (as in our case).
However, some have criticized mainstream scenario planning methods for their tendency to simply reinscribe current thinking and reinforce the status quo. In contrast, critical approaches designed specifically to question epistemological norms may offer a way to more deeply examine cultural assumptions and transform mental models [32, 33] . Inayatullah [34] , for example, drawing from Foucault and poststructuralist theory, describes -causal layered analysis,‖ a critical approach intended to draw attention to differences in epistemological traditions and help participants work across those differences. This approach may generate deeper shared understandings that enable collaboration; on the other hand, the lack of immediate practical implications may fail to interest participants concerned with policy. At the other end of the futures spectrum, at a more technical level, empirical methods like forecasting may increase participants' understanding of commonalities in their future visions and expectations, but most forecasting processes lack the creative and communicative aspects that might lead to deeper changes in mental models.
Scenario planning, and the Shell method in particular, is not the only approach to futures thinking that might increase the propensity for collaboration, nor is it necessarily the only approach appropriate for the situation at hand. However, given the lack of research evaluating the effectiveness of these methods in inducing organizational change, an assessment of the widely used Shell scenario planning approach seems appropriate and potentially useful in improving our understanding of actual organizational impacts.
Literature evaluating scenario planning
Excepting the detailed Shell example [1, 2] , much of the literature promoting scenario planning's -transformational‖ benefits relies predominantly on authors' subjective experience and a few case studies to support these claims [3] [4] [5] [6] 11, 13] . Relatively few studies report on the outcomes of scenario planning either in terms of organizational performance, as achieved through superior strategic planning, or in terms of the impacts on participants, as achieved through educational and communicative processes. The scarcity of evidence of outcomes has prompted skeptics to question the merits of scenario planning [35] . Even supporters agree more evidence is needed [28, 29] . Chermack [36] lays the foundations for A few studies have documented the processual outcomes of scenario planning. Chermack et al. [37] surveyed a group of scenario planning participants (9 total participants) about whether they believed their organization (-a large educational institution‖; p. 771) had gained knowledge and problem-solving capacity; most respondents agreed to both questions. Roubelat [11] presents a qualitative case study, showing how scenario planning helped build formal and informal networks within the French Electric Company; however, the study did not attempt to quantify organizational outcomes. Phelps et al. [38] examined the relationship between scenario planning and firm performance in a public sector setting, water provision (22 responding firms), and a private industry, IT consultancy (25 responding firms). The analysis showed a positive correlation in the IT industry, but no significant correlation in the water sector. The study did not distinguish between improved strategy and organizational capacity as possible factors influencing performance.
Focusing specifically on collaboration, Cairns et al. [13] explore the potential of scenario planning as a catalyst for inter-organizational collaboration around the use of communications technology in local government service provision. Using qualitative methods of observation and interviews, the authors describe two similar cases of scenario planning processes in the UK: only one led to enhanced collaboration among government agencies. The authors posit that the variation in the end result was attributable to individuals' characteristics within the agencies involved. Goodier et al. [39] also present a case of multi-agency scenario planning in which they suggest, among other outcomes, the process may have increased shared understanding and potential for joint solutions, but the evidence presented is vague.
Literature in the urban planning field includes a growing number of studies on collective processes related to scenario planning, such as visioning and consensus-building [40] . For example, Helling [41] evaluated the outcomes of Atlanta's large-scale public visioning project, which included over a thousand participants, using interviews and a participant survey. The study concluded that the process clearly helped participants build interpersonal relationships and networks, but did not produce any other action or tangible results. In an evaluation of a collaborative regional planning process in South East Queensland, Australia, Margerum [42] found that although the process failed to achieve all of its objectives, it did encourage the planners and policymakers who participated to coordinate on future projects. While studies on visioning and collaborative planning processes are instructive, these activities, as commonly practiced in urban planning, are distinct from scenario planning in that they build on existing views of the future (visioning) and expressly seek consensus (collaborative planning), whereas scenario planning aims to confront existing assumptions and does not require consensus.
In all, the literature on scenario planning has not adequately supported the claim that the technique, with its emphasis on dismantling previously held mental models, holds a unique ability to impact interpersonal dynamics. The existing evidence rests largely on a handful of case studies. Nor has existing research provided empirical methodologies founded on collaboration theory. Without more research on such second-order process-related effects, we cannot know whether, and to what extent, this -organizational-learning‖ aspect of scenario planning holds true, especially in the land use-transportation planning arena, where some forms of the technique have recently surged in popularity [43] .
Theoretical background

Communicativist theory
To understand why scenario planning might increase the propensity for collaboration, we refer first to communicativist theory and second to organizational perspectives on collaboration. Much as collaborative 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 6 planning theory was influenced by communicativist ideas [44, 45] , claims of the educational and transformational effects of scenario planning rest on assumptions shared with the communicative action theory outlined by Habermas [46] and with the concept of structuration proposed by Giddens [47] . These influences are rarely explicit in the literature. Habermas [46] suggests that rationality is constituted through social interaction; that is, during the process of communication, actors jointly construct ways of knowing that govern their understanding of the world. Structuration theory suggests that the structures that govern society are socially constructed and therefore alterable through social practices like discourse [47] . The implication is that the very process of collective deliberation, so central to scenario planning, fundamentally alters participants' knowledge, perceptions, and interactions. These theoretical perspectives help explain why we might expect scenario planning to generate strong second-order effects.
Similarly, some authors have drawn from post-structuralist critical theory to explain why certain uses of scenarios might alter participants' perceptions and understandings. The post-structuralist project of deconstructing systems of knowledge, exemplified by Foucault [48] , aims to turn attention to how contextually specific worldviews and epistemological norms shape our knowledge and understanding. Inayatullah [33, 34] describes how this critical view can be applied in group deliberation about the future. If designed properly, he posits, collective discussions of scenarios can prompt participants to question their own assumptions and consider alternative worldviews, which might ultimately leave them more open to alternative courses of action. However, Inayatullah [34] argues that mainstream scenario planning (i.e., the Shell method) typically does not fulfill this function to the extent that more critical methods do.
Collaboration theory
The idea of scenario planning as a collaboration catalyst is consistent with existing research from the organizational and public policy literature on processes of collaboration. In reviewing the many studies that attempt to explain how inter-organizational collaboration arises, from both public and private sector contexts, we identify three categories of factors that help foster collaboration: (1) characteristics specific to the participating organization (e.g. organizational goals), (2) characteristics of the external environment, (e.g. legal requirements) and (3) external catalysts that trigger the collaboration process. Here, we focus on organization-specific factors because these are most likely to be influenced by the scenario planning process. The following paragraphs describe how these factors contribute to collaboration; see, also, Fig. 1 .
Existing actor networks
Actors embedded in strong organizational networks-that is, the set of relevant actors and the relationships between them-a re more likely to collaborate and have an increased likelihood of successful outcomes [49] [50] [51] [52] . Both the number and quality of inter-organizational connections are positively correlated with the emergence of collaborative partnerships [51] . Partnerships tend to endure longer if parties had previously positive interactions, in part by enabling actors to judge each other's trustworthiness and legitimacy [49] . Pre-existing links also provide information about others' intentions and capabilities, so organizations can recognize opportunities for cooperation and better avoid risks.
Shared definition of the problem
A common understanding of a given problem's wider context appears important to initiating collaboration, especially for complex issues like urban development, where each partner has responsibility for only a small piece of the entire picture [53] . Agreement on the problem definition helps actors recognize their stake in the problem and the help needed from others to solve it [49] .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   7 
Recognition of need for collaboration/Past failure
Unsurprisingly, collaboration requires mutual recognition of the need for collective action in solving the problem [49, 54] . Decision makers will more likely recognize this need when previous efforts to address the problem have failed, or when they believe separate efforts are likely to fail [49] .
Common interests and objectives
Organizations that have similar goals and interests-and that recognize those commonalities-will more likely find that collaboration produces efficiencies and synergies. However, some organizations, especially public agencies, may have ill-defined, ambiguous, and/or multiple goals and therefore may not recognize their common interests or may otherwise be less inclined to collaborate.
Methodology
In light of the above, we devise a method to measure the extent to which scenario planning fulfills its implicit collaborative-enhancing potential and demonstrate the approach using a stakeholder-based scenario planning exercise carried out in Portugal. Specifically, we study a scenario planning process designed and implemented by academic researchers as part of a larger project examining, quantitatively and qualitatively, the possibilities for leveraging the land use-transportation interaction to help facilitate urban revitalization in Portuguese cities. Attempting to assess the exercise's effects, we conducted a pre-/post-workshop survey in which we asked participants to complete one questionnaire before the first workshop (25 January, 2010) and a second questionnaire after the second workshop (2 March, 2010) . In addition to the survey, we observed the workshops' proceedings and reviewed documents reporting the workshops' output.
At the outset, we must identify several potential shortcomings of the demonstration. First, the results, however tentative, only relate to the -Shell School‖ of scenario planning. Second, the results regarding the second-order effects of the scenario planning exercise are likely influenced by the quality of the exercise and the facilitators, neither of which were explicitly evaluated. Third, the results, as evidenced by a self-reported questionnaire, may miss more nuanced effects that could only be detected via in-depth interviews or other qualitative techniques. In addition, the limited number of respondents, and their variation across the two surveys, may introduce biases of unknown consequence. Finally, the relatively short time-frame of the pre-/post-experimental design, necessary due to the timeframe of the larger research project, may fail to capture second-order effects with a longer gestation period.
Scenario planning workshops and scenario output
The project team invited representatives from 40 different Portuguese organizations-including municipal governments, transport operators, central government agencies, public redevelopment companies, real estate interests, and universities-to participate in a series of three scenario-building workshops focusing on the issue of urban revitalization. While European authorities distinguish between urban renewal, urban regeneration and revitalization, and urban rehabilitation and restoration [55] , this particular project used -urban revitalization‖ as a general term to refer to the challenges cities face due to aging buildings and infrastructures, changing economic structures, etc. Such challenges, by their nature, require integrated policies and actions involving a number of authorities and private sector actors relating to transportation systems, social services, historic preservation, real estate interests, and so on [55] . In Portugal these sectors often operate separately, although the professional communities are relatively small and already overlap to some degree.
Because the scenario planning exercise aimed to inform an integrated urban modeling project, the workshop invitations targeted policymakers and experts rather than members of the general public. The workshop approach followed typical steps of scenario building, as previously adapted to the urban transportation realm [25] . In the first meeting, 37 participants worked in groups to identify key local 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   8 factors and driving forces, and categorize them according to relative degree of uncertainty and importance (to the urban revitalization challenge). In the second meeting, 23 participants used these local factors and driving forces to construct possible scenarios, which consisted of combination of driving force -states.‖ At final meeting, held in July 2010, the project team presented the final scenarios-in this study, we focus only on the first two workshops. The workshops generated three scenarios, ultimately titled -Social Crisis,‖ -New Dynamics,‖ and -Technology-led Development.‖ Appendix A provides a brief description of the scenario development methodology and a summary of the results.
Survey
The surveys attempted to measure the -propensity to collaborate‖ by capturing the organization-specific factors that contribute to collaboration and that might be influenced by the scenario planning workshops (Table 1) . Here, we understand propensity to collaborate as a measure of the likelihood that organizations, or individuals in organizations, will enter into and maintain, to some degree, a process of collaboration. We take the individual as the primary unit of analysis, recognizing that individuals are embedded in several other structures-their organization, the group of workshop participants, a network of individuals, and a network of organizations.
Existing actor networks
Important dimensions of actor networks include the number of inter-organizational links and characteristics of those links, such as frequency of interaction or substance of transactions. Social scientists have developed widely accepted survey methods for characterizing individuals' social networks [56] ; some have suggested adapting similar approaches to organizations [57] . For example, frequency and mode of communication can be a proxy for the strength of relationships, and can be captured by questions like -how often have you communicated with friend X via email in the past 30 days?‖ The pre-workshop survey borrowed these techniques in order to roughly characterize respondents' general level of interaction with other organizations. To reflect the formation of new links, the post-workshop survey asked respondents whether they made additional acquaintances as a result of the workshops.
Recognition of need for collaboration/Past failure
The survey attempted to measure participants' views on the seriousness of urban revitalization issues and the need for collaboration. Both the pre-and post-workshop surveys asked respondents to rate the importance of urban revitalization policies, given the situation in their city; any shift in the reported degree of importance might indicate the workshops' influence on participants' perceptions.
Common interests/objectives
In both the pre-and post-surveys, we asked respondents to indicate the degree to which they believe their organization shares objectives with other organizations. We also asked respondents the degree to which urban revitalization is relevant to their organizationa question especially important for individuals from agencies more distant from the revitalization issue, who may not initially recognize revitalization's relevance to their work.
Understanding of wider context
We expected that, in workshop discussions, the joint construction of understanding would broaden, deepen, and clarify views previously held by participants. To capture changes in understandings, respondents of both pre-and post-workshop surveys were asked to relate their definition of urban revitalization in their own words. The post-workshop survey also asked respondents directly if they believed the workshop influenced their understanding of the issue. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   9 
Shared definition of the problem
We expected the workshops would not only change participants' understandings, but also create convergence among them. The respondents' definitions of urban revitalization were analyzed to assess both the initial incidence of overlap and the degree of convergence in the concepts presented.
Results
Of the 37 workshop participants, 22 responded to the pre-workshop survey and 17 to the post-workshop survey. Workshop participation and survey completion were encouraged but ultimately voluntary, so we unfortunately had no control over respondent attrition. The nature of the sample and the number of responses does not allow generalization to all participants, but the results do afford insights into our measurement methods and the workshops' effects on these particular respondents. The respondents to both surveys represent a reasonable cross-section of the workshop participants in terms of city, sector, and level of government, as shown in Table 2 . For questions for which we aimed to detect changes in preand post-workshop responses, we apply appropriate statistical techniques to test the differences.
Existing actor networks
According to responses from the pre-workshop survey, many respondents were already fairly well connected within professional actor networks. Most respondents were personally acquainted with at least one individual in all types of organizations; many knew more than three (Table 3) . Although email and telephone were by far the most common modes of inter-organizational communication, 36% said they regularly met with colleagues in person, indicating that some of these inter-organizational ties are quite strong.
The post-workshop survey confirms that the great majority of participants made new acquaintances as a result of the workshop. Out of 17 respondents, 16 said they met new people; 88% reported that they were previously unacquainted with most of the other participants in their discussion group. The majority of respondents met at least two new acquaintances. The number of new acquaintanceships did not correlate with the respondent's sector.
Understanding of the wider context
To detect potential shifts in respondents' definitions of urban revitalization, we coded responses according to whether they mentioned any of nine concepts that represented the range of ideas contained in all the definitions. Some of the terms overlapped; for example, -sustainability‖ can be understood to include social and economic issues, but we treated it as a distinct concept. Many respondents mentioned only physical aspects of urban revitalization, such as -rehabilitating historic buildings,‖ while others gave more comprehensive definitions like, -making areas competitive and attractive.‖ As Fig. 2 suggests, respondents' characterization of urban revitalization did not noticeably change. In the two surveys, although respondents used different phrasing, they mentioned the same concepts at about the same rate. This consistency may reassuringly indicate the reliability of the question. However, the results do not support the hypothesis that the workshops influenced participants' understanding of urban revitalization.
Shared definition of the problem
As noted, participants' definitions of urban revitalization did not indicate a change in their understanding of the issue. However, when directly asked, most respondents indicated that participation in the workshops did improve their understanding of urban revitalization (Table 4 ). Respondents who worked in central and regional levels of government were more likely than those from lower levels to strongly agree that the workshops improved their understanding of the issue, an expected result, since officials 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 10 more distant from urban revitalization issues would have the most to learn. Respondents also indicated that, in general, they found themselves to share common opinions with other participants (Table 4) .
Overall, the results prove inconclusive in terms of a shared understanding of the problem. The workshops may have somewhat influenced participants' views, but the evidence does not suggest convergence in their understandings of urban revitalization. This may indicate that: respondents initially held at least some common views, leaving less space for convergence; and/or, the workshops may have, in some cases, caused participants' views to diverge or at least reaffirmed existing divergences.
Recognition of need for collaboration/Past failure
The results of both surveys indicate that, in general, respondents agreed on the importance and relevance of urban revitalization to their organizations. Furthermore, they agreed that organizations will need to work together more to achieve urban revitalization objectives. However, the pre-and post-surveys reveal no significant change in respondents' views about the issue's importance or relevance 1 . Of course, we would expect respondents to initially view urban revitalization as important, since all chose to participate in the workshops.
The respondents exhibited less consensus on the effectiveness of existing urban revitalization policies. Most post-workshop survey respondents moderately agreed that existing policies have been effective, while a sizable minority moderately disagreed (Table 4 ). Almost unanimously, respondents said that agencies need to work together more on the issue of urban revitalization. Overall, these responses suggest general agreement on the importance of urban revitalization and the need for collaboration to improve the situation.
Common interests and objectives
All respondents could name the formal objectives of their organization, and many recognized at least some shared objectives with other organizations. Respondents' perceptions of common objectives appear to have shifted slightly in the direction of more shared objectives (Table 5) ; however, the shift is significant only for objectives shared with regional authorities. That is, the scenario planning exercises did apparently generate some increased recognition of shared regional objectives, not an unimportant result in the face of the recognized need for, and sporadic movement towards, supra-municipal governance in Portugal [20] .
Indeed, 94% of post-workshop respondents indicated that, during the workshops, they held at least some of the same opinions as fellow discussion group members, suggesting that respondents did find areas of common interest. The vast majority of respondents also recognized the relevance of urban revitalization to their own organization, indicating the topic may serve as a common objective. On the other hand, the workshop appears not to have changed opinions on urban revitalization's relevance; that said, since respondents initially believed the issue to be relevant, the workshop was unlikely to increase this perception much.
Together, the findings regarding perceptions of other participants' interests tentatively suggest that the workshops helped participants to find common ground. Evidence from the survey suggests that interorganizational interaction in the workshops may have, to a slight degree, helped participants to articulate 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   11 previously unrecognized mutual positions. In particular, the workshops seem to have generated increased recognition of shared objectives with regional authorities.
Survey limitations
Our survey methodology faces a number of limitations. First, although the respondents are representative of workshop participants, the response rate does not allow generalizations beyond the particular survey respondents. In addition, due to the need for anonymity/confidentiality, we do not know if the same individuals who responded to the post-workshop survey also responded to the pre-workshop survey. If a different set of individuals responded, the comparisons between pre-and post-may be misleading. Furthermore, the response sample may be biased toward participants who were more interested in the topic and the overall workshop process.
The pre/post structure of the survey also introduces challenges. The post-workshop survey repeated some of the first survey's questions in identical language but not identical order. We hoped that, after two months, respondents would approach each question with a fresh view, but they may have recognized the question and responded in the same way again. To aid in measuring changes in perceptions, the survey also explicitly asked respondents if they believed their views had changed. However, such questions pose their own challenges, since respondents may be inclined to respond with the expected -correct‖ answer, regardless of its accuracy. Furthermore, participants received the post-workshop survey only two weeks after the second workshop, which may be too soon to capture latent effects of the exercise.
Finally, the subjective nature of the factors we tried to measure introduces substantial challenges. Survey questions cannot easily capture the nuances of people's understanding and perceptions of complex issues like urban development, nor changes in these perceptions. While the methods to measure interorganizational relationships are relatively well-established, the reliability and validity of other questions-for instance, questions about respondents' perceptions of the workshops-have not been verified.
Discussion
Overall, the approach offers an example of how the second-order effects of scenario planning exercises in the public sector realm can be assessed. The results of the example application suggest that participants began the scenario planning process with a certain propensity to collaborate. The workshops may have increased this propensity slightly, by further developing an already existing inter-organizational network and increasing a sense of shared objectives with regional-level agencies. The latter effect intimates possibilities to support regional-level cooperation, an increasingly recognized need in the urban development sector in Portugal [e.g., 20].
The pre-workshop survey responses indicate that many of the factors contributing to the propensity to collaborate were already present. The results point to prior existence of some inter-organizational connections, some recognition of urban revitalization as a problem, and some common points of understanding regarding the issue-all factors which theoretically contribute to a higher likelihood of collaboration.
Beyond this initial level, the findings suggest that the scenario planning exercise likely increased respondents' propensity to collaborate to a small degree, primarily by creating and reinforcing interagency connections on an individual level. Based on their responses, participants made several new acquaintances as a result of the workshop. However, the survey reveals little change in factors related to respondents' perceptions-factors expected to derive from the communicative processes during the workshop. When explicitly asked, respondents reported changes in their views, but the pre-and postquestions designed to detect this change do not corroborate the respondents' reports.
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The lack of evidence for change in perceptions may have several explanations. First, the survey's ability to measure subjective changes may have been limited. We used a survey because we intended to demonstrate a method that would provide quantitative evidence of scenario planning's impacts and could be scaled up for larger studies. However, complex constructs such as a participants' mental models may be more easily revealed through a combination of survey and interview methods. In addition, the research time frame is important. The most direct indicator of scenario planning's outcomes would be a measure of how much collaboration has actually occurred. However, collaboration between organizations can take years to develop, especially around complex and long-term issues such as urban planning. We intended to design a method that could detect impacts within a more easily observable timeframe. Realistically, changes in perceptions may take longer than the period over which we attempted the measurements.
Second, shortcomings in the workshops' design or execution may have prevented them from having the expected impact. Although the workshops followed guidance available in the literature on scenario planning [5, 6, 39] , the workshops may have been too short, or the facilitators too inexperienced.
Third, the findings may indicate that scenario planning via the Shell method does not have a significant effect on people's views. Or, more generally, the theory that dialogue and mutual engagement in the planning process leads to enhanced perceptions and understandings may simply not hold true in practice to the degree expected.
Finally, we may have reason to suspect that conventional scenario planning, as typified by the Shell method, is simply not well suited to the setting of multi-stakeholder discussion of urban revitalization in Portugal. As discussed in section 2.2, existing literature suggests the method is appropriate; however, the difficulties of translating scenario planning to a multi-organization, public sector context may pose a fundamental obstacle.
Match between method and context
Much of the literature on scenario planning implicitly suggests its relevance in situations far beyond the corporate settings for which it was developed [4, 5, 58] . As Volkery & Ribeiro [9] argue, however, translation of the approach to the public sector introduces some particular challenges. In contrast to the private sector, where organizational boundaries are relatively well-defined, public agencies often have fuzzy boundaries, making the line between internal and external forces unclear [59] . This problem becomes compounded in situations involving multiple organizations: given heterogeneous participants with different realms of influence, factors clearly external to one organization might be within the influence of another, making it difficult to separate scenarios that represent uncertainties from scenarios that represent possible strategies [9, 59] . Indeed, outputs of our Portuguese case indicate that, despite facilitators' instructions, participants often confounded -key factors‖ with potential policies and -plausible scenarios‖ with ideal visions.
Multi-organization settings might also pose challenges for the conventional scenario planning method. Originally designed for small groups within a single organization, scenario planning becomes more complicated with a larger, heterogeneous group with vague problems. In our case, the focus issue-urban revitalization-sounded simple and clearly defined, but, like many social issues, it could be interpreted in many ways, further complicating discussions. Even though facilitators outlined a systematic approach, some participants clearly became confused by the number of key factors and possible combinations and by the overall complexity of the process. Adaptations of the method for heterogeneous groups have been demonstrated by others (e.g., [39] and may be more effective. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   13 applying scenario planning to this context could be resolved. Furthermore, the lack of evidence for change in perceptions throws into doubt the claim that scenario planning can foster collaboration through its unique emphasis on questioning participants' assumptions. Potential second-order effects of scenario planning, at least of the -Shell school‖ approach applied in multi-agency urban land use-transportation applications, should be viewed with greater skepticism.
Other variations on scenario planning might have produced more transformative results. Slaughter [32] , for example, questions whether mainstream scenario methods, which are ultimately based on knowledge of existing trends, can actually change a status quo mindset and proposes that only more critical methods such as -causal layered analysis‖ can truly alter participants' mental models. We cannot say whether such a critical approach would be appropriate for this particular context, nor whether it would have produced more noticeable second-order effects.
Conclusions and directions for future research
In this paper, we set out to develop and demonstrate a technique to help answer the question: does scenario planning, when applied to an inter-sectoral urban planning challenge such as urban revitalization, actually fulfill its proponents' claims of leading to enhanced organizational learning and collaboration? In attempting to answer this question we hoped to add to the sparse research on the second-order, organizational impacts, of scenario planning, focusing specifically on a sector where scenario planning applications are on the rise. We examine the -Shell school‖ scenario planning approach and situate the potential second-order effects within a theoretical framework of the propensity to collaborate. Drawing from this theory, we identify several organization-specific factors that may influence collaborative tendencies in an inter-organizational settingexisting networks, shared understanding, recognized need, and common objectivesand operationalize these factors within a pre-/post-test experimental design.
The results from the specific scenario planning application examined, involving representatives from different Portuguese organizations involved in transportation and urban development, indicate that the stakeholder-based scenario planning exercise likely had modest impacts on participants' propensity to collaborate in the future. Specifically, we detected impacts on inter-personal networks and an apparent increased recognition of shared objectives with regional agencies. The latter effect suggests some promise for increasing regional collaboration. Nonetheless, our results should be viewed as tentative, as they come from one particular application with a limited number of participant responses, with effects measured over a relatively short timeframe. We believe that this work offers a valuable precedent for more rigorously examining the oft-claimed organizational impacts of scenario planning exercises and hope that it stimulates additional related research, building from the techniques demonstrated.
Several useful extensions to this research exist. Studying the workshops' effects over a longer time period may reveal longer-term effects. For example, a similar survey implemented some time later may capture latent effects and, after two or three years, it may be possible to determine whether the workshops actually did lead to new forms of collaboration, measured, perhaps, through actual projects undertaken. Findings from such an inquiry could shed light on the validity of the -propensity to collaborate‖ measure.
In addition, if the scenario planning workshops' most significant effect was the creation of interorganizational relationships, we might ask how these kinds of workshops differ from any other event which convenes related professionals-say, a networking conference specifically designed to foster new relationships. Proponents of scenario planning suggest that the in-depth, future-oriented discussions of scenario-building provide a unique context for forming relationships not available in other arenas [6, 58] . However, more extensive comparative analysis would be needed to answer this question. In theory, such analyses could also compare the organizational effects of alternative scenario planning and futures thinking methods .  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   14 More generally, to better assess the ability of collaborative scenario planning to produce the transformational effects that its proponents espouse, we need better measures of these outcomes. More empirical investigations of scenario planning's second-order effects could help better understand the relatively unsubstantiated organizational effects claims typically used to promote scenario planning. Future examinations could pair survey-based methods, such as the one demonstrated here, with qualitative interviews.
Finally, our findings caution practitioners to carefully consider context before undertaking a scenario planning process. In the Portuguese case, difficulties arising from multiple organizations and vague problem definition likely partially compromised the process' effectiveness. In situations involving numerous heterogeneous actors, where problems are not easily defined, methods other than scenario planning-or at least variations on the conventional method-may be more successful.
With regard to the larger context of policy integration, while the evidence suggests that conventional scenario planning may increase the likelihood of collaboration, it may not do so more than other collective, future-oriented activities, especially given the challenges of applying scenario planning in the public sector. Even if it does increase the propensity for collaboration, scenario planning will not lead to better coordinated policies without other supporting conditions in place. With coordination and integration high on the urban policy agenda, we need to deepen our understanding of the various conditions, factors, and mechanisms that truly support collaboration.
Appendix: The Scenario Planning Workshops and Summary Descriptions of the Scenarios
The urban revitalization scenario planning participation process consisted of two workshops, supported by additional information synthesis and elaboration before and after the workshops by the project team. During the first workshop (25 January 2010), after introductory discussions about urban revitalization and the scenario planning process, participants were divided into groups representing, within each group, different disciplines, agencies, and urban areas and tasked with identifying local factors and driving forces, categorizing the latter by degree of relative importance and uncertainty. Each group was accompanied by two project members, one for facilitation and one to take notes. The project team synthesized these materials in the period between the first workshop and the second workshop and summarized them with a consolidated set of driving forces. Table A .1 presents the consolidated -latent‖ driving forces and example variables categorized within each.
In the second workshop (2 March, 2010) , the driving forces and the corresponding set of underlying variables were presented and used as the basis for discussion. In this workshop, participants were again divided into groups (with facilitator and note-taker) and presented with the consolidated set of driving forces and underlying variables and tasked with utilizing these materials to elaborate logical and plausible scenario storylines (i.e., with consistent -states‖ of the underlying variables). Based on this exercise, workshop participants arrived at a set of three scenario storyline plot foundationsconsisting of combinations of driving force states, which themselves were associated with directional states of the underlying constituent variables. This process resulted in the three scenarios, summarized briefly below and in Table A .2.
Scenario 1: "Social Crisis"
This scenario associates a growing Portuguese population with economic stagnation and neutral technological change under a strong central government. The central government asserts greater power over local authorities. This concentrated power allows the government to implement a wide-reaching economic strategy aimed to boost growth and innovation. Part of this plan involves increasing the immigration rate and reviving population in the cities. While the strategy does achieve a more dynamic social structure, the country still fails to gain an edge in an increasingly competitive global economy. As a result, Portugal's economy stagnates and the country undergoes a -social crisis‖: many immigrants and 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   15 young people are unemployed, leading to social inequality, segregation, and insecurity. Technology continues to evolve, but at a modest rate, and does not contribute greatly to the economy.
Scenario 2: "Portugal Novo"
This scenario is characterized by strong economic growth, dynamic social structure, and technological advance under empowered local governments. The decades-old decentralization initiative has gained renewed support and the central government devolves several key powers and capabilities to local authorities. The increased autonomy of municipalities leads to sometimes conflicting urban and environmental policies and inconsistent enforcement of regulations. At the same time, however, the intensified competition between cities brings more innovation in urban policies, greater public-private cooperation, and a distribution of public resources that more directly facilitates local economic growth. Increased immigration and in-migration of young people to the city centre revitalizes economic and social life in the historic districts; however, the city's new residents do not mix well, leading to socially differentiated neighborhoods with localized areas of poverty and crime. Investment in research and technology has helped initiate rapid technological advance that both contributes to and evolves from the continuing economic growth; innovation and change are the norm. New transportation and construction technologies contribute to dynamic life in the city centre. Energy costs rise, but are outpaced by economic growth and technological change.
Scenario 3: "Technology-led Development
In this scenario, economic stagnation and population aging are associated with technological advance. Here, demographics tell the story. The aging population clings to an inward-looking and insular cultural orientation. Local governments have gained more power and, directed by their constituents, they choose to focus narrowly on local issues; meanwhile the weakened central government fails to implement a coherent economic strategy. Fears about crime and the threat of social change lead to restrictive immigration policies, but, without the added demographic influx, the population continues to decline. The historic city centers lose population as the suburbs retain a more highly desirable status and the fragmented government structure has insufficient capacity to promote urban revitalization. The declining population and lack of coherent strategy contribute to economic stagnation. Meanwhile, the rest of the world develops new technology at an even faster rate and, hoping to spark an -innovation economy,‖ the government and private sector adopt new technology wholeheartedly. Yet, without the conditions to support economic growth, investments in technology fail to produce strong returns. Despite economic distress, local communities remain strong and are marked by long-term and close-knit social ties. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 Fig. 1 . Organization-specific factors that contribute to the propensity to collaborate. In this study, we attempt to specifically measure the factors in dark gray. 13.0% 0 0 a "Other" refers to the municipality of Aveiro b "Other" refers to parking, environmental assessment, construction, and management of European Union funds. c A sub-division of a municipality; similar to "civil parish" in the United Kingdom. To test whether the shift in objectives shared with regional agencies is be due to the lower representation of municipal organizations in the post sample (see Table 2 ), we applied the Fischer's exact test (a statistical significance test for contingency tables with small sample sizes), which revealed no evidence of a relationship between the respondent's organization and the pre-post test scores. For example, there is no evidence that respondents from municipal agencies necessarily shared more or fewer objectives with regional agencies, either before or after the workshop. We share almost all objectives (5) We share many objectives (4) We share some objectives (3) We share few objectives (2) We do not share any objectives (1) central government agencies regional planning authority municipal governments transport operators real estate associations -Central Govt Agencies -Regional Planning Authority -Metropolitan Planning Agencies -Municipal Government -Municipal or Regional Transport Operators -Urban Revitalization Agencies -Real Estate Associations A.2 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I already knew most of the participants at my table in the workshops. -The workshop helped give me a better understanding of urban revitalization issues.
-I found that the other participants at my table held views on urban issues that were very similar to my own.
-I now have more ideas about policies or strategies to improve urban revitalization.
-The workshop has not changed my ideas on urban revitalization at all. B.5. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements.
-My city's efforts to address urban revitalization have been very effective.
-We cannot reach our urban revitalization goals unless the institutional system changes.
-If we are to be successful in urban revitalization, different agencies need to work together more. -Our current system can achieve the goal of urban revitalization, if only we have the political commitment to implement the right policies.
-I am worried about the ability of my city to address future challenges of urban development.
C. Organizational Goals
C.1. Please indicate in the table below the extent to which your organization shares objectives with the types of organizations listed. Consider other organizations in your metropolitan area, as well as agencies of the central government.
We share almost all objectives (5) We share many objectives (4) We share some objecives (3) We share few objectives (2) We do not share any objectives (1) central government agencies regional planning authority municipal governments transport operators real estate associations C.1.a. [IF (1) or (2)] For those organizations with which you do not share objectives, do you think that having different goals has been a hindrance to the activities of your organization? 
